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“A book must be the ax for the frozen sea in us.” 
Kafka, letter from 19041 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
How does a distinctly ethical dimension appear in a literary work? In exactly which features of a 
work does this ethical dimension, when such there is, reside? And why should we be interested in 
moral evaluation when reading works of narrative fiction, offering as they so often do an 
opportunity to escape the burdens of reality, with morality often one such burden? There are surely 
a variety of legitimate answers to these questions, depending on the kind of literature one has in 
mind. My concern here is with only one way of answering them, and in respect to only one kind 
of literature. The Trial will provide my example. It shows us, I argue, something unexpected and 
largely overlooked about how a literary narrative can achieve ethical significance and distill it into 
a value, that is, a reason for ascribing a kind of worth to it that becomes essential to our ability to 
compliment its artistic success.  
My starting point is critical. I take issue with a way of understanding the ethical core of art 
that is widespread in contemporary philosophical aesthetics, at least as practiced in the 
Anglophone world. I criticize it as an insider, but my frustration with it is continuous with a general 
disappointment many literary theorists have with contemporary analytic philosophy of literature: 
its failure to reckon seriously with literary modernism and so to address fully the challenge it poses 
to many of our standing habits of thought regarding the nature of literature. The Trial offers an 
example of the kind of modernist work that complicates our theories and to which they must be 
made adequate, assuming we do not wish to run afoul of the last 100 years of literary culture. What 
The Trial brings to our attention is that the ethical dimension of literature need not consist solely 
or even essentially in what a work says and depicts. That is, it need not be internal to its 
representational content. The Trial pursues its fundamental ethical project obliquely, often through 
manipulations of nonsensical and “impossible” employments of language and imagination, and it 
holds out the promise of a degree of autonomy to the reader who is willing to work through its 
critical project. This, it turns out, is key to understanding how certain works of literature, modernist 
or otherwise, achieve ethical goals more radical and remarkable than those the current state of the 
debate is able to acknowledge.   
 
  
Beyond Attitude 
 
 Philosophers who proceed without caution have a habit of speaking of the ethical and 
aesthetic dimensions of art as though they are easily locatable and plainly distinguishable features 
of works, the “ethical” as residing here, in their “morally repugnant” parts, the “aesthetic” as 
residing there, in the bits that are “beautiful” or “relevant to a work’s status as an artwork.” 
Perhaps, one always wants to say; but clearly much more needs to be said if we are to achieve 
clarity on what a work must do, in properly artistic terms, to endow its form or content with ethical 
relevance and make it matter to its status as a work of art. In better work in the field, a certain 
model dominates, and while it casts helpful light on this matter, it has serious limitations when we 
begin to look at serious art of last 100 years.2  
One can fairly call the model attitudinal. In labeling it thus, I define the model in terms of 
the aspect of it that most interests me, perhaps in a manner its proponents will find exceptionable. 
Nonetheless, it offers a strikingly intuitive and simple—this is not to say correct—answer to the 
question of how an artwork comes to possess a distinctly ethical character, and this is what matters 
to my discussion. The core idea is straightforward.3 In the very act of representing actions and 
events, a work of art inevitably, “also presents a point of view on them, a perspective constituted 
in part by the actual feelings, emotions and desires that the reader is prescribed to have towards 
the merely imagined events.”4  A work’s “point of view,” then, is revealed partly through the 
sentiments the work manifests but also in those responses it seeks to elicit from its audience (one 
suspects that the two are often indistinguishable). This is effectively what delineates the basic 
standpoint a work has in respect to its own content: how it “feels about it,” as it were. If we can 
speak of a literary work as manifesting a particular perspective on its content—and surely we 
can—then it seems a steady step from this to granting that the perspective is at times charged with 
moral valence. A perspective is a stance, and a great many stances are ethical stances: properly 
moral modes of expressing an attitude. To put it formulaically, a literary work possesses an ethical 
dimension by virtue of having an attitudinal structure, a basic stance of approbation or censure the 
work evinces in respect to the characters and events it represents. This, the idea goes, is what 
constitutes a literary work’s ethical character. And once we note that it is in the very nature of 
attitudes to be open to questions of appropriateness, fit, and warrant, a foundation for the ethical 
criticism of art begins to appear, should one be inclined to engage in it.  
This often is a subtle affair, since, we know, the explicit narrative voice of a novel and the 
attitudes it expresses—think of Humphry Humbert—can diverge from the attitude the work itself 
seems to express in respect to its content, and it is the latter that matters here, as the idea of that 
general orientation in thought and feeling a work seems to bear in respect to the regions of human 
experience and circumstance it represents. There is debate, and obvious room for maneuver, when 
we ask precisely which features of the work bear these attitudes—the narrator, the implied or 
manifested “author”, and so on—but what is crucial is that on this model these attitudes are borne 
by the work. They are ultimately part of its semantic structure, since they in part determine what 
the work is about, bound up essentially with our sense of the overall “vision” its struggles to 
elaborate. Now lest someone think something silly, virtually no players in this debate are interested 
in condemning or censuring works with morally challenged attitudes. Rather, the concern is to go 
on to theorize the relationship, if any, between the moral success (or failure) of an artwork and its 
artistic or aesthetic success (or failure). Nonetheless, it makes this form of investigation into the 
relationship between the moral and aesthetic dimensions of art possible by virtue of it how it 
  
answers the question of what literature’s ethical character fundamentally consists in, and the notion 
of an attitudinal structure is the answer it provides.5   
There are features of the attitudinal model we should wish to retain. But if read as offering 
an answer to the question of how literature comes to bear ethical significance, it begins to feel 
clumsy and insufficient when looking at works like Eliot’s The Waste Land, Beckett’s Waiting for 
Godot, Faulkner’s The Sound and The Fury, Joyce’s Ulysses, and, of course, The Trial. The reader 
will note that I stopped myself just shy of producing a list of literary modernism’s greatest hits. 
This is not, or not just, because in modernism narrative voice (or the perspective of the manifested 
author, etc.) is often too ambiguous—or too opaque, too inconsistent, too alienating, too alien, too 
mendacious, or too chaotic—to seem possessed of a determinate attitudinal structure and so ethical 
character. These and other features of high modernist narrative technique surely complicate the 
idea that a novel has a perspective or expresses an attitude, at least if by these one expects to find 
manifested in a work something like a stable and settled state of mind. But it is also easy to make 
too big a deal of this, since an attitude or perspective can itself be ambiguous, inconsistent (etc.) 
in respect to a state of affairs, and, if so, questions of moral warrant can be asked of it. The problem 
is otherwise. It has to do with the fact that in modernist literature the ethical ambitions of art begin 
to change and to demand more than attitudinal models can accommodate.  
The Trial is important here because it brings to view much of what theories such as these 
leave out, or, at any rate, much of what they must take heed of if they wish to travel to more 
politically engaged and au currant regions of artistic production. To state the concerns baldly at 
first mention, The Trial challenges the idea that a novel’s ethical character is constituted by its 
attitudinal structure, certainly one that is manifested in features of its narrated—and thus 
representational—content. Content is obviously important, but, as we will see, The Trial brings to 
our attention a general truth about much narrative literature: it can bear properties—forms of 
meaning, aboutness, and ethical significance—that are irreducible to any feature of its narrative 
and its manner of elaboration, and these extra-representational features are at times what endow a 
work with its distinct ethical character. Moreover, and more damning, The Trial shows us that 
attitudinal models are insufficiently critical to be able to capture the ethical dimension of a work 
with more radical moral and political aspirations. The Trial seeks a revolution in, not an application 
of, ethical thought, and this requires more than questions of appropriateness and warrant of attitude 
can provide. And lastly, The Trial attempts to enfranchise its implied audience to a much greater 
degree than would seem possible on an attitudinal model. On an attitudinal model, when we 
evaluate a work’s moral quality, we assume the traditional third-personal stance of judgment and 
ask whether the attitudes a work manifests (or seeks to elicit from the reader) are warranted, and 
once we have an answer we have effectively concluded our labor. The Trial may demand some of 
this, but it chiefly seeks a change in, not a verdict from, us.  
The point that is essential to my argument is that The Trial is far more damning of the 
world than are any of the attitudes given expression in its narrative, and thus the latter cannot 
explain how it achieves its particular ethical character: its meaning, significance, and import as a 
piece of ethical thinking. To be playful but not inaccurate, Kafka would expect that if Josef K. or 
the narrator—the two express the lion’s share of moral attitude in the novel—could read The Trial 
as intended, they would find themselves vile, though of course not to same extent they would find 
the agents of the court vile. This is not to say that the attitudes expressed in the text are morally 
unwarranted. The story is right, in an obvious moral sense, to present the madness Josef. K must 
endure as unwarranted, as wrong, since indeed it is. This is the attitude expressed by the narrative 
voice and it is also that of the manifested author (The Trial often does not distinguish the two). But 
  
here’s the rub. The attitudinal structure present in The Trial, the vantage points internal to its 
narrative, stands in judgment of an institution and the features of society complicit in it. Call it 
bureaucracy. This is what the voice of the narrative condemns. Yet the work, as an entity that is, 
in some still undefined sense, broader than its narrative, stands in judgment of something much 
more general: an entire form of life, one that is presumably continuous with our own, at least at 
the moment of modernity Kafka found himself an author. Thus the philosophical question is how 
do we get from one to the other, from the narrative and the attitudes expresses there to a conception 
of the work’s ethical interests, which I am claiming is a different thing altogether? This is the 
question The Trial obliges us to take seriously. 
 
 
Titorelli’s Mirrors 
 
It would be wise to explain this problem literarily rather than philosophically, that is, in 
terms of an actual problem we might encounter in our experience of The Trial. What matters to 
my argument are the features of the story that earn it its claim to absurdism. We have, most 
obviously, the nightmarish geography of the world of The Trial, of physical spaces that seem 
impossibly linked.6 And these hold in place various other of the absurdist elements of the story. 
These geographic spaces often represent the distinct spheres of ethical life: our personal, sexual, 
familial, professional, and spiritual spaces. Thus the upending of these spatial borders is also the 
undoing of many of the boundaries essential to personal and social flourishing (it is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that Josef K. is unlucky with both the law and love). But the absurdist elements 
go beyond this. What seems most absurd, ultimately, are not the impossible spaces or 
unfathomable procedures of the court, but the manners, the forms of etiquette, the officiousness, 
the concerns about productivity and professional advancement, the demanding of reasons, that 
Josef K. holds on to throughout the story, except, perhaps, in the very final lines. All this “culture” 
begins to appear incongruous, hollow, even ridiculous, against the backdrop of such an irrational 
and absurd world.  
None of this is news, and these features of the work are well enough known that it would 
be tedious to elaborate them here.7 This is just as well, since I can elaborate my argument by way 
of a discussion of two mere objects that Joseph K. encounters. The scene is in Titorelli’s room, 
and the objects are the paintings he shares with Josef. K. The portions of the text that describe the 
paintings are for us, though not for Titorelli and Josef K, ekphrastic. They are examples of 
ekphrasis not only in the sense that we have a case of using words to depict paintings, as poets on 
occasion have a habit of doing. More generally, they are ekphrastic in the wider sense that the 
descriptions of the paintings are themselves a painterly employment of language, one which 
conveys meaning not by divulging propositions but by presenting aesthetically and morally 
charged images. Jointly, these images embody the sense of the world that Kafka is struggling to 
articulate in The Trial, condensing into two pictures much of its essential feel and strangeness. 
Kafka is reputed to have told Max Brod that he saw the world as one of God’s bad moods, and the 
paintings effectively elaborate the affective and aesthetic dimension of a world so conceived.8   
Josef K., recall, is sent by a colleague to Titorelli’s studio in the impoverished periphery 
of town to try one final time to influence the courts. Titorelli, who has assumed a grand and clearly 
foreign name, paints portraits of court officials. Like Tintoretto, whose name we hear in his, 
Titorelli paints those in power, if not the clergy and aristocracy of 16th century Venice then of the 
judiciary class of the unnamed early 20th century city in which he lives. The contrast is productive, 
  
even if the point it yields is now clichéd: the modern artist who works in the service of power can 
no longer be an artist, since an artist whose relation to culture is uncritical and affirmative—who 
looks upon it and attempts to produce art by reproducing what he sees—is bound to run afoul of 
the aesthetic and cultural standards that govern the production of art. We see Titorelli as an “artist,” 
not an artist; and this is in part because his relationship to his society is all wrong. There is a kind 
of risible tension in the very idea of an artist who serves the courts in a world such as this, in a way 
there isn’t in the idea of 15th century Venetian artist doing somewhat the same, even if corruption 
and general forms of nastiness are rampant in both cultures.  
The first painting we find is one of Titorelli’s portraits of an officer of the court.  Its attempt 
at hagiography produces incoherence. The painting contains a depiction of a deity of challenged 
identity. Titorelli wishes to represent, “Justice and the goddess of Victory in one,”9 though he 
ultimately wants it to resolve into an image of “the goddess of the Hunt.”10 The figure is situated 
“atop the back of the throne,”11 in which a judge sits, painted in gaudy pastel, per the judge’s 
request. The figure upon the throne represents whatever it is that the judge, and so the courts, 
ultimately serve, nominally the Law and Justice but indistinguishable from other forms of power 
operative in the state. Justice is conjoined with Victory, thereby disrupting a mimesis of 
impartiality with an expression of conquest and domination; and the painting adds to this awkward 
tangle of divine bodies the goddess of the Hunt and so a figure who actively seeks prey, for 
example in the form of “innocent” citizens such as Josef K. K. remarks on the confusion of labor 
here. Justice has “wings on her heels” but, he chides, she “must remain at rest, otherwise the scales 
sway and no judgment is possible.”12 Titorelli concedes the problem and adds “a few strokes to 
the contours of the figure, without, however, making it any clearer in the process.”13 One is left 
with the sense that it would be impossible for the painting to be made any clearer. It is what a 
metaphysician might describe as an essentially vague object, that is, an object to which added 
detail does not result in increased determinacy.  
I take the painting of the judge to have a symbolic function twice over. In the first instance, 
it has a broadly synecdochical role: it is a part of the text that comes to stand for the whole of the 
text. Since “everything belongs to the court,”14 including the children who throng the hallways of 
Titorelli’s building, this is effectively an image of the force that animates and binds the various 
spheres of culture. It is an image of the institutional and so social world in which Josef K. finds 
himself. But it also registers as a symbol, now just more abstractly, of the world beyond the work. 
We are expected to feel our cultural situation implicated in Titorelli’s painting, at least to the extent 
we are expected to feel it implicated in The Trial, given that the former is representative of the 
latter. If this is so, then the painting provides a link that runs from Titorelli’s studio to the world 
of Josef K. and then on to ours.  
Note that this accomplishes something remarkable. It renders the nonsensical features of 
the painting properly mimetic, indeed the only features of the painting that enjoy genuine 
representational success. Because incoherent and nonsensical, these features of the painting can 
sustain a mimetic relationship, since Josef K.’s world is itself incoherent and nonsensical. Our 
world, one assumes, is taken to be this way, too, if just figuratively. For Kafka, in other words, our 
world is metaphorically nonsensical in the precise respects Josef K’s literally is, and in this manner 
the text here establishes a mimetic bond between the worlds of Josef K. and Kafka’s readers. This 
is in part, though no small part, why we experience The Trial as an act of cultural critique and not 
just an exercise in nightmarish fantasy. It is on account of this possibility of metaphoric 
identification with Kafka’s fiction, and the resultant mimetic link it helps establish between the 
  
nonsensical features of his world and ours, that the work is able to generate the air of moral and 
political seriousness, as intent on showing, even demonstrating, something.  
The painting of the judge, then, doubles for the social world in which K finds himself. This 
world, we know, is fraught: its intuitions are corrupt and it renders ethical life, whatever it may be, 
impossible: no genuine relationships can be cultivated, no enduring trust established, in a world 
such as this (K.’s various relationships with lovers, lawyers, and colleagues bear this out). What 
makes The Trial so damning is that it refuses to balance the despair of this with a glimpse of an 
emancipating elsewhere. If Kafka had been a naïve romantic, he would have put Josef K. on a train 
to the countryside, or perhaps in a boat to New Zealand, to discover a space not wholly damaged 
by culture and so a place of potential freedom. But none of this is permitted here, and so the vision 
of the world it offers is thoroughly bleak and unredemptive: it shows us an execrable world and 
offers no compensatory vision of a possible Eden.  
The second of Titorelli’s paintings recasts this point from a perspective external to the 
culture represented in this first. Titorelli describes it as “landscape of the heath.”15 If the first 
painting gives us culture, the second is an attempt to represent the world beyond it, passing, as it 
were, from the normative to the natural. The landscape it depicts is scarcely an image of beautiful 
and animated nature. It shows only, “two frail trees. Standing at a great distance from one another 
in the dark grass. In the background was a multicolored sunset.”16 We have here another symbol, 
but now of the extra-social world, and it is presented as just another absurd space. If the first 
painting shows an inhumane social world, the second depicts an inhuman natural world beyond it. 
The two wizened trees suggest not only alienation—they are separated, as though estranged 
people, by a great distance—but also the withering away of what once might have provided 
sanctuary from the reach of the institutions of the social order. The only light in the picture retires 
from the landscape with the sun. The sun is here, as it often is, a symbol of intelligibility, and as it 
sets, the extra-social world it illuminates is lost, too. Or so that is the feel of the painting, of which 
Titorelli’s possesses many, all identical, though he is blind to the repetition. If the painting of the 
judge represents the social world as incoherent and mad, the heath painting represents a world 
beyond it as unavailable to us. It is not, of course, an indictment of the current state of the natural 
world but of the imagination of an artist who is at home in a world like this. The suggestion is that 
the existence of a vital world past the monolithic institutions of culture has become unimaginable, 
at least for one like Titorelli, who accepts this world and his place in it.   
It is important to note that Titorelli’s efforts fail to produce art, and this is because mere 
mimesis in such conditions has nothing of value or interest to show us. Since uncritical, his 
paintings just reflect back to us the absurd and incomprehensible world in which Josef K. finds 
himself. They do nothing to overcome it or even to achieve a kind of clarity concerning its nature. 
And this leads to the first important point for my argument. Kafka’s relationship to The Trial is 
like Titorelli’s to his paintings, except that he, unlike the failed artist, will attempt to confront it 
and, to the extent a work of art can, overcome it. This turns out to be what distinguishes Kafka 
from Titorelli, as two artists who must work in a world that is either in fact or figuration of a piece 
with Josef K.’s. Read in this light, this section of the text functions both to reveal the conditions 
of artistic impoverishment in a world such as this and to draw our attention to what more The Trial 
does with its representation of absurdity such that it eludes these conditions. Put in simpler terms, 
we are here invited to consider what more is demanded of an artist, and to see Kafka as in part 
struggling to answer this.   
Note that from a perspective internal to the text, the only significant difference between 
Titorelli’s paintings and Kafka’s The Trial is the following: while in each we find an incoherent, 
  
absurd, and senseless world, only The Trial expresses disapproval. The narrative of the novel, and 
the content it generates, yields this and nothing more. In this respect, the attitudinal model is 
vindicated. That is, we find in the content of The Trial a stance of condemnation in respect to these 
nonsensical features of Josef K.’s world. And this is a fine thing, revealing as it does that the work, 
if you will, has its head on straight. But this also is deeply unsatisfactory as an ethical response to 
its content, and it is false to our sense of the ethical significance of Kafka’s labor. Surely it cannot 
be that the novel has achieved the extraordinary ethical and political significance critics and 
philosophers have afforded it over past 92 years just because it says No, in effect, to the patently 
immoral events and experiences it narrates. By the lights of virtually everything we know about 
ethics, in the face of such horror a judgment can at best be the first step to proper moral 
engagement, the initial registering of a problem for which some further act or provides a solution. 
It falls entirely short of an ethical response, which, one would think, calls for action in addition to 
judgment. Something that amounts to a confrontation, not merely recognition, is needed. We 
expect that something be challenged, changed, or overcome, and not that a mere stance or attitude 
be expressed. But here is the apparent problem. All we find in the representational content of The 
Trial is the narrative voice, which just expresses attitude.  
So my argument hangs, then, on the idea that The Trial offers more than mere attitude, and 
thus we need to identify what this something more might be and how it is brought to view, if not 
in the work. But what could this mean? 
 
Bad Worlds, Good Works 
 
Consider a series of interlocking claims about the relationship between art and society. I 
derive them from Raymond Geuss on Adorno, though it should be no surprise that what one says 
about Adorno also works for Kafka, given the great importance Kafka’s writings played in the 
development of Adorno’s moral, political, and cultural thought. Geuss’s theses about art in an age 
of decay will help me stage the positive point I wish to make about The Trial’s ethicality and what 
it means to claim that it is in some sense external to its content.  
The first claim is that, “if we accept for the sake of argument that our social world is evil 
[…] a number of interesting consequences follow for art.”17 Among these consequences is that art, 
to the extent it is ethically serious, must confront this world in a very specific manner. It cannot, 
like Titorelli’s paintings, simply mirror it. Nor can it earn its claim to ethical seriousness merely 
by expressing righteous moral attitudes in respect to it. Assuming that our world is fundamentally 
immoral, a great degree of representational honesty is demanded of art.  
This leads to the second claim: “any form of art (or of religion or philosophy for that matter) 
that contributed to trying to make people affirm this world or make them think that it was 
worthwhile would not just be doing something unhelpful, but would be misguided in the most 
fundamental way possible.”18 Art must show the world to be as debased and inhospitable to human 
life as it in fact is, and so it follows that there is one thing art produced in the condition of an “evil” 
social world must never do. It must not be at home in it. In representing it, it cannot accept it, it 
cannot suggest that comfort can be found in it, that there are pockets of decency that make the 
terrible whole finally bearable, that we can escape it by becoming hipsters and moving to 
Brooklyn, diminish its oppression by dedicating ourselves to charity or by voting for a really liberal 
candidate, and so forth. The social world is, ex hypothesi, the ethically corrupt object. The problem 
is not with various of its institutions but with the thing itself. And so, according to this line of 
thought, the thing itself must change. The idea is that art’s formal and imaginative powers must be 
  
used to this end, at least if we concede all that morality demands of an artist who is obliged to 
create in such conditions. To refuse to assume these responsibilities is to be, in effect, Titorelli. 
This casts light on how Kafka wishes us to answer the question of what distinguishes his 
art from Titorelli’s. Both attempt to produce art in the condition of “social evil,” but only one 
succeeds. This is because only one realizes that it is by virtue of infusing the product of one’s 
creative activity with a critical element that it can achieve a degree of distance, and so a measure 
of freedom, from it. It by virtue of a critical element that we can say that a work of art comes to be 
“about” more than what it represents and thus that it is able to generate forms of meaning and 
significance that are in excess of its unrelentingly despairing content. But in what does this critical 
element consist? The third and final claim is that art produced in the condition of social evil—the 
condition, presumably, of European modernity—must “make [people] as keenly aware as possible 
of the discrepancy between […] their world as potential paradise and their world as actual 
catastrophe.”19 It is by creating an awareness, through extra-representational means, of this 
contrast between our world and one worth having that an artist endows a work with a critical 
element.  
We still need to know what these “extra-representational” means are, but the basic point is 
clear enough. On this model, the modern work of art must confront the world by forcing us to 
acknowledge the space between it and a world we should wish to inhabit; a world, say, in which 
general ethical flourishing is possible, on a cultural level and partly by virtue of its defining social 
and political institutions, and so a social world that is, following this line of argument, very unlike 
the actual one. This is one way of putting what more than mere mimesis, what more than simple 
depiction, is demanded of art in a world such as this. As we saw, “art” that simply pictures such a 
world, that just represents it as it is, will by necessity fail to generate art properly so-called. And 
this is because it will fail to generate something worth looking upon: it will bear no aesthetic value 
since the object itself is empty of beauty and human meaning. It is the introduction of this critical 
element that marks the chief difference between a Kafka and a Titorelli.  
An otherwise counterintuitive point now becomes compelling, and it is one that runs 
mightily counter to the manner in which attitudinal models explain how art achieves ethical 
significance. Art that is produced in certain contexts—for example, in the context of profound 
cultural decay—partly earns it status as art by virtue of possessing an ethical project, that is, a 
project of creating in the subject a distance, and so a degree of freedom, from the forms of thinking, 
feeling, desiring and valuing at home in our present cultural context. In other words, we cannot 
first have an object that we all agree to be art and then go on to wonder whether we will find 
something of ethical worth lurking within it. It is rather the other way around. It is because a 
mimetic object appears to possess a critical project that it can begin to appear as art, properly so-
called. It is only as such that we are welcome, on philosophical grounds, to apply the term “art” as 
a properly evaluative concept: one that casts an artifact as enjoying a degree of imaginative, 
creative, and aesthetic success. It is because we detect the shimmering of ethical significance in an 
object that we are given confidence that what we have before us is not a mere ornament, a pretty 
piece of propaganda, or a manipulation of the beautiful and sublime in the service of sleep and 
forgetting. Art, as Schiller once thought, holds out a promise of moral and political freedom, and 
the point on offer here is that in certain cultural conditions a serious critical project becomes a 
necessary regulative ideal in the production of objects that aspire to the status of art. Something 
must be done with a representation if it is to become art; and on not infrequent occasions it is the 
possession of a critical project that explains how an artwork transcends its rotten world in the act 
  
of representing it. This is what makes it possible for a story, a lyric, or a painting to bear genuine 
artistic value: to be art.  
This is the kind of model that clearly requires the historicizing of its central claims. It is at 
best true of art in specific cultural contexts indexed to specific points in time. But note that it is 
not so narrow that it will hold true only if an artist is writing in Mitteleuropa in the wee hours 
before the dawn of National Socialism. The concept of a thoroughly evil social world travels, of 
course, to a startlingly wide array of times and places. In fact, we do not even need to explain 
precisely when it is true that a social world is evil. On purely philosophical grounds, all one needs 
to grant to make it true of us is that in our social world there is widespread suffering and alienation, 
and that this has something to do with the way it is organized culturally. Put differently, one just 
has to grant that fixing it will oblige us to create what amounts to a differently arranged form of 
life, at least in basic institutional and social respects. If one grants this, then one can concede the 
great ethical and political importance of a cultural practice that reveals to people the difference 
between “their world as potential paradise and their world as actual catastrophe.” Something must 
happen such that we are prompted to envision the world otherwise and thus can begin to give initial 
content to the idea of “potential” paradise, or just of place that is better than this. We need to come 
to feel that the material our social world gives us for making sense of our relationship to one 
another is flawed, contingent, and capable of being jettisoned, again, even if we do not quite know 
what the alternative shall be. Revolution starts with refusal, an initial damning expression of “no” 
to that which defines one’s current material circumstances.  
It is this inclusion of a “potential paradise,” of an undiscovered and as of yet 
unconceptualized “other-than-this,” that is important here and that identifies what more than mere 
attitude Kafka offers us. But, again, what is it, exactly, and how does the work voice a concern 
with it? We have established that no such paradise is represented in The Trial. To do so, to present 
Josef K.’s world as possessed of a paradisiacal element, would be to lie, and The Trial earns part 
of its claim to ethical seriousness because it refuses to offer false hope. It would also, one assumes, 
be to introduce a didactic element into the work, which is never a good thing, in art or in life. One 
might be tempted now to go on to locate this element in the work’s form, thereby keeping it internal 
yet acknowledging that it is not an explicit feature of its narrative and so representational content. 
And indeed as literary theorists and philosophers of art (Adorno, for example) are often in the habit 
of telling us, The Trial is a case of a work of art in which form itself seems to do a lot of the 
thinking. This is true enough, but it will not yield what we are after. The manner in which The 
Trial presents its content—the tone, diction, and imagery it relies upon to relate it to us as a story—
makes it very clear that on a formal level the work is more critical of the world than it is at the 
level of content. If content just yields expressed attitudes, as I have claimed, at the formal level we 
have a kind of Verfremdungseffekt, a distancing or alienating effect that establishes a felt gap 
between the attitudes expressed in the story and the more incriminatory view the work itself takes 
of its world. It is very likely also true that the alienating manner of formal presentation of content—
and the oddness, the absurdity, it adds to a picture of life so represented—is largely what creates 
the sense of a critical and so, on my account, ethical project. In other words, form does much work 
here. But it still does not yield what we are after: a statement of what the ethical project of the 
work is or an insight into just what it means to say that it represents actual disaster to yield an 
awareness of possible emancipation.20  
The answer to this is hardly mysterious, though an impoverished picture of what art is can 
make it very difficult to articulate it. Setting matters straight requires seeing that there is a subtle 
category error in how we tend to frame questions of how a literary work achieves its distinct ethical 
  
character. If we ask questions about a work’s “meaning” or query what its story is “about,” it is 
natural to assume that we are asking questions about a work’s interior. It is natural, that is, to think 
that whatever can act as an answer to our question will be found in the linguistic and formal mortar 
that constitutes the literary work itself.  But, I suggest, The Trial shows us that questions about 
ethical significance at times function very differently, not as a call to elaborate a redemptive 
meaning, image, or attitude to be found inside a text but something of a different kind altogether. 
Ethical criticism often calls on a distinct evaluative stance, one that conceptualizes the work as 
something other than, or at least in addition to, an object.  
After all this discussion the idea is not far from us. Everything I have said about The Trial 
links questions of ethicality to questions about what a work strives to accomplish, to create the 
conditions for, to bring about, to make happen. What is on the inside of a work is certainly crucial 
here, as it has been in my treatment of The Trial. That is, we cannot talk about what a work tries 
to bring about without talking about its form and content, just as we cannot talk about a revolution 
without elaborating the challenged form of life, and the reasons for demanding change, that give 
rise to it.  But when we ask questions of the ethical project of a work, of how it evinces a concern 
with confronting and, with hope, ameliorating our present condition, the appropriate stance is to 
regard it as much more akin to an action and not, or not just, as an object. We must shift evaluative 
categories, looking away from those in which we make sense of things to those in which we make 
sense of events. A literary work is an action performed by means of creating an object, of course. 
But as with any action, it is performed for a reason, shot through with purposiveness, responsive 
to pressures in the world around it, and always, ultimately, an attempt to effect a change in it.  This 
is, incidentally, one way of explaining why Titorelli’s art feels so inert as art. It does nothing; it 
permits itself to be a mere object.  
If we view a novel as a kind of doing and not simply a kind of thing, we are granted access 
to information and meanings that a mere object can never yield. One reason, a defining one, for 
writing a novel like The Trial is to clear the ground in the culture for which it was written for a 
new form of ethical life. It has absolutely nothing to show us about what this new form of ethical 
life might be. Eden, as it were, remains unavailable. It yields no propositions, it asserts nothing, it 
has no list of theses that specify just what is wrong with this world. But this is no loss. Its ethical 
significance does not consist in a declaration but a deed. The point of The Trial—not the point of 
its story but the writing of it—is to create in the reader the capacity to give content to the idea of 
an elsewhere in which ethical life is in fact possible. The novel has no interest in specifying this 
content. It presumably does, however, have an interest in compelling us to become such that we 
might be able to, at least eventually and perhaps with a considerable amount of intellectual luck. 
If this is so, then literary works such as The Trial achieve their distinct ethical character 
not by expressing attitude but by virtue of promising a small but essential serving of autonomy. It 
is not, of course, aesthetic autonomy, about which The Trial would seem bound by character to 
abhor. It is not even quite political autonomy, for which The Trial implicitly hopes but which is 
nonetheless too far down the road it sets before us. It is a form of autonomy that is concerned with 
disrupting our sense of being able to be at home in a world such as ours. It strives to prompt us to 
acknowledge the inaptness of this world to our basic projects of living well, and it accomplishes 
this in part by poisoning our hope that we can find a place of sanctuary in this “actual catastrophe.” 
The autonomy this promises is of a humble but still vital sort: the offering of a measure of 
independence in thought and feeling from our world and the values that animate it. This critical 
autonomy, as we might call it, has as its goal is an awaking in us of a sense that we can think, feel 
and value otherwise than the present world conditions us to. This critical autonomy is essentially 
  
ethical, since it is implicitly about changing the constitution of the reader and so her ethical 
character. The whole point of it is to effect a change in how she hangs together as a thinking, 
feeling, and valuing being: to effect a change in, as it were, her ethos, with the hope that this will 
lead, with time and good fortune, to a broader change in our social and political ethos.  
If we are cynics, we will doubt that better values and improved forms of life will ever be 
forthcoming. But if the cynic can intelligibly recite these worries, this itself will betray that she 
has achieved a degree, evidently non-negligible, of critical and so ethical autonomy from this 
world, regardless of whether she wastes it on generating skeptical hypotheses instead of attempting 
to imagine an improvement. This form of autonomy is, in a formal sense, just the degree of freedom 
in thought that is presupposed by the notion of critical distance between a mind and its culture, not 
various of its institutions and practices but, again, the thing itself. In itself this form of autonomy 
is neither redemptive nor transformative, and so those who hear a hope-beyond-hope in talk of 
freedom needn’t begin to worry. It is the critical act it makes possible that interests me and, if my 
argument is sound, is of interest to The Trial. This is the particular gift it gives to ethical thought: 
the capacity to imagine values and forms of personal and cultural flourishing in excess of those 
our culture makes available to us. Much follows from this gift of a more directly material and 
political sort, but it cannot follow without this initial serving of critical and so, on my account, 
ethical autonomy.21 It is in this sense that The Trial seeks to be, as the epigraph has it, an “ax for 
the frozen sea in us.”  
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Notes 
 
1 As quoted in Gerhard Richter, “Introduction,” in Language Without Soil: Adorno and Late 
Philosophical Modernity, edited by Gerhard Richter (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2010), 5. 
2 Following custom in this debate, I use the terms “ethical” and “moral” interchangeably. 
Philosophers as temperamentally diverse as Hegel and Bernard Williams will insist on 
distinguishing them, and I have argued elsewhere that doing so improves our conceptual 
resources when attempting to contribute to the debate I outline here. See my “Thick Narratives,” 
in Narrative, Emotion, and Insight, edited by John Gibson et. Al.  (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2011). For the purposes of the argument I develop in this essay, 
there is no need to distinguish the two.   
3 The question that animates the debate in contemporary analytic aesthetics is much broader than 
the question of in what a work’s ethical character consists: it asks whether any sort of systematic 
link between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of art obtains such that success or failure in 
one domain determines success or failure in the other. The extreme positions on this have few 
defenders, radical moralism and radical autonomism, which, strive to provide absolute answers 
to these questions: crudely, the ethical success (or failure) of a work of art is always, or never, 
relevant to just assessment of its aesthetic and artistic success (or failure). Varieties of moderate 
ethicism (the idea that a positive evaluative link between the ethical and aesthetic success of a 
work at times obtains) and immoralism (the claim that no general link obtains, and indeed moral 
flaws can at times be essential to aesthetic success) rule the roost. For helpful overviews of the 
major positions in the debate on the relationship between moral and aesthetic value, all of which 
I drawn on here, see: Berys Gaut, Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), A.W. Eaton, “Literature and Morality,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy 
of Literature, edited by Noël Carroll and John Gibson (London: Routledge, 2015); Matthew 
Kieran, “Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations 
to Artistic Value,” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006); and Noël Carroll, “Art and Ethical Criticism: 
An Overview of Recent Directions of Research,” Ethics 110 (2000). For a recent defense of 
radical moralism, see Alessandro Giovanelli, “Ethical Criticism in Perspective: A Defense of 
Radical Autonomism,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 71 (2013). For defenses of 
immoralism (robust, moderate or otherwise) see: A.W. Eaton “Robust Immoralism,” The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (2012); Daniel  Jacobson, “Ethical Criticism and the Vice of 
Moderation,” in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, edited by 
Matthew Kieran (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); and Matthew Kieran “Forbidden Knowledge: The 
Challenge of Immoralism,” in Art and Morality, edited by José Luis Bermúdez et al. (London: 
Routledge, 2003). For a broad discussion of the relationship between the aesthetics and ethics, 
see Elisabeth Schellekens, Aesthetics and Morality (London: Continuum, 2007). 
4 Gaut, Art, 231. 
5 There is great variety in the ways in which philosophers use the notion of an attitudinal 
structure to ground link between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of art, but the following 
offers a sense of the possibility it opens up. Works of representational art typically attempt to 
prompt forms of affective and cognitive response from the reader or viewer; they strive to get her 
to feel or to believe something about its content. The successful eliciting of these responses can 
                                               
  
                                                                                                                                                       
at times be essential to a work’s aesthetic success, and when it is we can begin to detect what a 
proper evaluative link between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of art looks like. This is 
often titled a “merited response argument” since everything is made to hang on the issue of 
whether, from the moral point of view, the responses the work seeks from us are warranted. (See 
Gaut, Art, 227-250).  
6 I am thus in agreement with Noël Carroll when he claims that, “Kafka’s technique is to recall 
the original wisdom and horror embedded in ordinary expressions like the labyrinth of the law by 
representing the biological basis of the metaphor in terms of geographic confusion. The narrative 
and stylistic themes of being lost or spatially disoriented are ideologically motivated attacks on 
the experience of bureaucracy,” Noël Carroll, Interpreting the Moving Image (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 196. 
7 For that, see Neil Cornwell, The Absurd in Literature (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2006), 184-214. 
8 As cited in Michael Wood, Literature and the Taste of Knowledge (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 31. 
9 Kafka, The Trial, 145. 
10 Kafka, The Trial, 146. 
11 Kafka, The Trial, 145. 
12 Kafka, The Trial, 145. 
13 Kafka, The Trial, 145. 
14 Kafka, The Trial, 150. 
15 Kafka, The Trial, 163. 
16 Kafka, The Trial, 163.  
17 Raymond Geuss, Outside Ethics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 165. 
18 Geuss, Outside Ethics, 165.  
19 Geuss, Outside Ethics, 165.  
20 In last three years there have been a number of excellent works that see the writings of Kafka 
and Wittgenstein as having kindred ethical projects. This is not surprising, since the Tractatus, 
published four years prior to The Trial, is itself a kind of masterpiece of philosophical 
modernism that uses nonsense, as The Trial itself does, to motivate its critical project. For 
discussions of this see the essays collected in Michael LeMahieu and Karen Zumhagen-Yekplè, 
eds. Wittgenstein and Modernism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). Also see Karen 
Zumhagen-Yekplé, “The Everyday’s Fabulous Beyond: Nonsense, Parable, and the Ethics of the 
Literary in Kafka and Wittgenstein,” Comparative Literature 64 (2012).  
21 In thinking through these issues, I profited immensely from Andrew Goldstone’s Fictions of 
Autonomy: Modernism from Wilde to de Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
